Case Study:
Abstract
In India, as in other parts of the world, a large percentage of the rural population depends on forests critically for a vast range of forest products and services. This critical dependence shapes and defines the relationship of people with forests. On one hand, these dependencies drive resource dependent poor to exploit forests for subsistence and livelihood and abet the process of degradation, while on the other, it also prompts local people to take positive steps to conserve these resources.
This paper is based on a case of collective forest management system, which is one of several thousand similar forest protection and conservation initiatives by communities in India. It explains how these local arrangements seek to regulate access and control over neighbouring forest patches and in effect bring open access forests under CPR regime of the communities. Along with an analysis of equity issues and other challenges facing the forest managing communities, the paper briefly examines some of the current policy frameworks and certain emerging directions towards an alternate forest management system.
This case exemplifies the ingenuity of community institutions and institutional arrangements to evolve, modify and adapt over time. Such community forestry initiatives present new options for management of depleted 'State' forests. This holds promise for the future.
Introduction: Changes in Forest Ecosystem and Local Responses
The Dhani Forest is located in the Khurda Forest Division of Orissa State in India at 85°19'30''E and 19°56' N. It is a large tract of Reserved Forest (RF) having mixed dry deciduous type of forest vegetation. Dhani Forest has an area of about 2200 hectares out of which 839.75 hectares are being protected by a group of five villages since 1987. In Dhani, protection was initiated on the backdrop of large-scale degradation of forests. Pressure on forests for forest produce as well as on forestland for conversion to agriculture began to intensify due to population increase[2], as well as due to revenue oriented exploitation of forest by the State. Degradation of Dhani RF had serious impact on the neighbouring population. Soon villagers realised that forest degradation affected them the most, and hence the initiative to reverse the trend of forest degradation would have to come from them. Consequently, five villages in the vicinity of Dhani forest got together for collective management. They formalized forest protection and management activities through formation of a Forest Protection committee, named as Dhani Panch Mouja Jungle Surakhya Committee, in September 1987. The committee discussed extensively the various problems relating to forest, their causative factors, and settled ways to tackle these. Notices were issued to all villages in the area intimating them about 'forest protection'. Strict rules were framed for dealing with the pressure on forest.
Early Years of Forest Protection: Dealing With Forest Offences
Offence incidents
Checking forest offences was one of the immediate tasks at hand for the Committee. The graph: 1 shows that the incidents of forest offence were remarkably low in the initial years as the villagers were especially enthused and an elaborate protection arrangement had been worked out. Moreover the forest was degraded and offered little temptation to the offenders. However, there was a sudden increase in the number of offences in 1991 when the total number of cases went up to 25 and subsequently fell to 3. This sudden increase in forest offences coincides with the growth of forests due to regeneration. By 1991 most forest areas, that were open-access forests earlier, had come under community protection severely restricting the access of people to forests in the locality. Dhani forest had good vegetative cover and it made an attractive proposition to try and take wood from here. Even for the five-village group, depending on others' forest, while their 'own" forests regenerated did not work any more. Thus, they also started violating their rules and started taking wood.
Graph 1: Total No. Of Offence Cases
There are also other internal factors that resulted in the increase in offences during 1991. Though the forest had regenerated profusely by 1991, there were no corresponding changes in the rules pertaining to access to forest. Both genuine needs as well as frustration with the existing rules and management led the residents of Panch Mouja to get involved in breaking rules and becoming offenders in their own forests. The graph: 2 shows that the extent of involvement of Panch Mouza villagers was about 300% more than outsider in 1991. This indicates growing dissatisfaction of the group with the forest protection system. Owing to pressure on forests from the Forest Dependant Section (FDS) and their growing resentment the Committee was forced to accede to changes in the forest rules after 1991 that allowed greater flow of benefits from the forest to the people. (Detail analysis on this has been put in a later chapter) In 1994 and 1995, outsiders once again started coming to Dhani forest and 1995 recorded no direct involvement of Panch Mouza villagers in offence cases.
Graph 2: Offenders Identity
Offenders' Identity: Forest Dependent Section (FDS) and Non-forest Dependent Sections (NFDS)
Graph 3: Involvement of Groups in Forest Offences and their origin during 1987-1995
FDS refer to the sections of the community who have a major livelihood dependence on forests and in Dhani they constitute about 40% of households. These are basically landless, mostly tribals and schedule castes. In the initial stage of protection, these groups suffered major loss of their livelihood source, i.e. forests. The involvement of the FDS in forest offences is recorded high as compared to NFDS in both inside and outside of Panch Mouza. The low involvement of FDS from outside Panch Mouja is basically because of the risk of entering others' forests.
The related data of 1991 presented in graph: 4 shows that the total number of cases by FDS from Panch Mouja in 1991 alone is about 73 % of the total offence cases recorded in this category during 1987-1995. Similarly, involvement of FDS from outside villages is 50% of the total cases in this category during the same period. The low rate of offences by the direct forest dependant section during the initial 4 to 5 years of protection indicates their support to the forest protection initiatives despite hardships.
Graph 4: Involvement of Groups in Forest Offences and their origin during 1991
Analysis of forest offences by different groups relating to various species was also interesting. This indicated that most offences by the FDS are related to bamboo and fuelwood. In contrast, the NFDs' involvement in offences is confined to select species like teak, mixed timber species and other forest offences which include encroachment, mass destruction and similar. Offences by the FDS are more oriented towards livelihood where as the NFDs are basically oriented towards making a fast buck.
Graph 5: Offences by different Groups in Various Species during 1991
Decision making pertaining to Offences
During the initial years of forest protection, the committee could take no major decision regarding forest offences. For example, in 1987, there was no action after the seizure of wood. Subsequently, in 1988, the committee ordered further inquiry on the case but no final decision could be reached at. In 1989, out of two offences reported one was dealt with imposition of fine. However, with the growing number of offences imposition of fine became a standard penalty for offences. Latter unresolved cases were referred to the forest department. With the increase in actions on offences the subsequent years have recorded low forest offences.
Graph 6: Nature & No. of actions taken against the offenders
In the formative years the Executive Committee took all major decisions. In emergencies the General Body (GB) was also called. But the increase in forest related activities, especially forest offences, led to structural changes in the committee and others like the Working Committee (WC), Advisory Committee, Audit Committee, etc. were formed. Different offences were then decided in different committees. It is also important to note that the nature of meeting depends on the gravity of offence.
Graph 7: Nature and number of meetings held to decide offence cases
Dhani Panch Mouza Committee: A Learning Organisation
Changes in the Management System
Institutional Changes
The success of Dhani forest protection is based on a sound institutional mechanism. With regeneration the growing forest required efficient management. The committee was also expected to perform in a more diversified way in order to cater to the growing needs. Gradually, reformation in the institutional arrangement with a number of changes in the institutional mechanisms was effected.
As a first step, the forest protection committee was reconstituted in 1992 with certain changes in the institutional norms. To check irregularity in attending meetings a mandatory rule was made that members remaining absent in three meetings consecutively would be dismissed. Similarly, fines were to be imposed on members who either leave the meeting half way or do not attend even if they are present in the village. An Advisory Committee and a Working Committee were formed to guide and facilitate the functioning of the Executive Committee. Formation of these two Committees facilitated power equilibrium by accommodating old members in the newly formed Committees.
In 1994, an Audit Committee was constituted to look into the financial matters and thereby increase financial transparency. In 1995, Dhani Committee was brought under the Joint Forest Management Programme[3] of the State and the membership of the Executive Committee increased to 21 and women members were included in the committee for the first time. A Squad Party for wild life protection was formed to check the increasing instances of poaching.
Changes in Protection and Management System
During the initial years of forest protection a group of 25 villagers patrolled the forest on daily basis under Thengapalli[4] system. This large group was felt necessary keeping in view the extent of pressure on the forest. Once the pressure declined the number was reduced to 10. However, after 3-4 years of rotational patrolling the villagers were no longer keen to go on Pallia (patrolling duty). There were lapses in Palli. The poor and landless found it impossible to spend the entire day in the forest at the cost of daily wages. Following this, the committee decided to appoint paid watchers in 1991 and 1992.
Changes in Rules pertaining to Access and Use
Considering the growing resentment amongst the forest dependent sections the committee realized the need to allow regulated product-flow from the forests. As a result, it made the following rules pertaining to access and use of forest after 1991:
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Annual cleaning and thinning[5] operation before rainy season to ensure steady supply of fuelwood to the villagers.
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The people of Panch Mouza as well as the neighbouring villages are allowed to collect forest products free of cost and without permission.
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The forest dependants are allowed to sell fuelwood and other products.
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The members can take poles by paying nominal price to the committee.
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The members are allowed to take 100 bamboo at Rs 30/- every year for own use.
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The members are free to take wood for cremation without cost or permission.
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The neighbouring villages can get bamboo and timber with permission from the committee and by paying an amount. Special concession is made when the material thus sought is to be used for community festivals or after instances of fire or accidents.
Addressing livelihood and developing needs
By regeneration of forests and reappearance of products now a large percentage of the people in these five villages have been able to revert back to forest based livelihoods. The committee has made efforts to develop alternate sources of income for the FDS. It has arranged for leaf plate stitching machines for women's groups. 40 cows have been given to the forest dependant households. Few others have been allotted small patches of degraded forestland, which they have brought under grass cultivation.
The present forest ecosystem of Dhani has more than 250 plant species, 40 birds, 19 reptiles and about 20 other types of animals. The committee has banned hunting in the forest. It has constructed a waterhole in the middle of the forest to provide drinking water to the animals. The villagers through the forest protection initiative have established a School. Renovation work of a dilapidated pond near the forest has been undertaken by the committee to provide irrigation facility to the agricultural land.
Equity and Other Challenges
Community forest management efforts like Dhani have become quite common in Orissa State and elsewhere throughout India. About 10000 rural communities in Orissa alone have made some attempt to protect local forest patches for common use. Like the Dhani villages, many of these communities have shown remarkable ingenuity and sophistication in their institutional arrangements. But as with any group endeavor, successful forest protection by rural communities faces several obstacles and must withstand emerging strains. The problem becomes more acute once the forest regenerates and trees become larger and more valuable, increasing the temptation to harvest. Years of protection and cooperation can be undermined by such conflicts.
In many cases, the early-starters have taken up large areas for protection, leaving little areas for others. Once regeneration comes up neighbouring villages also want a share, which the protecting village feels morally justified to refuse. Such situations create tensions that sometimes lead to serious conflicts. Forest protection effort by a community can be seen as a coalition of different factions and interest groups coming together for a common cause. Since forest protection is a ´Gain - Gain' situation (implying that all sections of society tend to gain from forest preservation efforts even if the relative gains might not be the same for all) so it is comparatively easier to form a coalition. But such a coalition is subject to several tensions and strains.
Local forest protection programs are embedded in highly stratified and iniquitous social context which makes caste and gender inequities significant friction points. Often, an elite group dominates the village decision-making process - invariably men - that may marginalize women and lower-status sections of the community. Also, the very act of protecting forests by limiting access to them tends to adversely affect the poorer and more forest-dependent members of the village, who have few other options for fuel and livelihood. Both of these problems have shown up in Dhani. However, the Forest Protection Committee has tried to deal with these equity issues by allowing greater concessions and alternate income sources for the poorest members of the community.
Villages that have made traditional use of a forest yet have not been part of the effort to protect it sometimes resist when a community group tries to limit free access to the forest. This was just the case in Dhani. Kadamjhola, another village bordering Dhani forest, declined to participate in the original forest protection plan but now wants a share from the forest.
Role of the State Forest Department
The role of the Forest Department is another tricky issue. Thousands of villages who have protected forests expect to reap the benefits of forest regeneration and find the existing legal framework of Joint Forest Management unacceptable. Most feel that the State had provided little support during the early years of protection, and have come along after the forest has regenerated to stake a claim in the regeneration that is an outcome of their labour. And this they feel is unfair. By law, the state controls these lands and owns the resources as well, but in practice, local villages have taken more and more responsibility to manage them and they expect to reap the benefits of their efforts. This tension between legal State control and de facto local control has been a source of tension between communities and the FD for years.
Under JFM the commitment of benefit sharing is not honoured in practice. Even from patches protected by communities, or supposed to be co-managed by them, villagers only get "wages' for collecting the products and handing them over to State appointed agents instead of their value. In many cases, lease rights to Paper industries for harvesting bamboo (as labour contractors) from even forests that are protected by villagers have continued, creating significant tensions. Even in case of Dhani, villagers have still not got any share in the bamboo that they have regenerated, even though it is due for harvest.
There is considerable tension in the process of formalising the spontaneously evolved CFM systems under the JFM framework. It restricts the effective space available at community level for protection, management and use of forest resources. There are also several problems in the process of devolution of power to local communities. The existing forest tenure and legal framework lay the locus of control and decision making away from the actual users creating tension between the de-jure and de-facto locus of control.
Towards an alternate Forest Management system
Dhani Case has offered the community - as well as the world - some basic lessons in the value, degradation, and restoration of forest ecosystems. Such villages have demonstrated that local communities are possibly the best managers of the forests they live in and depend on.
In Dhani, as in other thousands of villages, the forest has always been a central feature in the life of the community, both spiritually and economically. It has been a source of livelihood, a place for ritual, and the tangible abode of nature - a vital element of the village life. As the forest condition degraded and the forest benefits dwindled, the fabric of the community began to fray as well. The local subsistence economy and the cash economy both suffered. It illustrated graphically that local people often have the greatest stake in the health and productivity of ecosystems and suffer most when they decline.
The years of forest scarcity led the Dhani villagers to a collective decision to act on their own. An action that helped to revitalize the community itself, even as it was restoring Dhani forest. Like many environmental campaigns, the effort to protect the Dhani provided a common rallying point among villages and villagers and helped renew their traditional link to nature in the form of "Mother Forest." Restoring a forest, the villages learned, can empower a community and help build a shared view of how common resources should be managed to keep them viable. The reward for their efforts has been tangible and significant for the finances of the community as well. It has added money to the common village fund, and brought economic opportunities to the poorest and most forest-dependent villagers. The case shows that local natural resources can also be used for sustainable economic development of the village.
Dhani villagers, along with thousands other similar cases, have proved that villages have the ingenuity to manage their own local natural resources. They provide us with alternate resource management models, wherein the local villages can use their resources judicially, in a sustainable manner and use these resources for all-round village development as well. Instead of State management of forests, community based management, facilitated by inputs and support from the State Forest Departments as well as other external agencies can lead to more effective forest conservation and management. This holds promise for the future.
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/ARTICLE/WFC/XII/0743-C1.HTM
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